We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom. JEL Classification, C72, C78.
Introduction
Since Nash (1950) , a bargaining problem is usually defined as a pair (S, d) where S is a compact, convex subset of IR 2 containing both d and a point that strictly dominates d. Points in S are interpreted as feasible utility agreements and d represents the status-quo outcome. A bargaining solution is a rule that assigns a feasible agreement to each bargaining problem. Nash (1950) proposed four independent properties and showed that they are simultaneously satisfied only by the Nash bargaining solution.
While three of Nash's axioms are quite uncontroversial, the fourth one (known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)) raised some criticisms, which lead to two different lines of research. Some authors looked for characterizations of alternative solutions which do not use the controversial axiom (see for instance, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) , and Perles and Maschler (1981) ) while other papers provided alternative characterizations of the Nash solution without appealing to the IIA axiom. Examples of this second line of research are Peters (1986b) , Chun and Thomson (1990) , Peters and van Damme (1991) , Mariotti (1999) , Mariotti (2000) , and Lensberg (1988) . The first three papers replace IIA by several axioms in conjunction with some type of continuity. The next two papers replace IIA and other axioms by one axiom. Lastly, Lensberg (1988) replaces IIA with consistency, and consequently a domain with a variable number of agents is needed.
In this paper, we provide an alternative characterization of the Nash bargaining solution in which the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives is replaced by three different axioms.
While all three of these axioms are known in the literature, they have never been used in combination. One of the axioms is independence of non-individually rational alternatives, which requires a solution to be insensitive to changes in the feasible set that involve only non-individually rational outcomes. This axiom neither implies nor is implied by IIA, but is weaker than IIA and Individual Rationality together. 1 The second axiom is twisting, which is a weak monotonicity requirement that is implied by IIA. The third axiom is disagreement point convexity which requires that the solution be insensitive to movements of the disagreement point towards the proposed compromise. This last axiom does not imply nor is implied by IIA. Further, the three axioms together do not imply IIA.
All of the axioms used in this paper have a straightforward interpretation except, perhaps, for disagreement point convexity. This axiom, however, has an interpretation that is closely related to non-cooperative models of bargaining. Assume that the solution recommends f (S, d) when the bargaining problem is (S, d). The players may postpone the resolution of the bargaining for t periods getting f (S, d) only after t periods of disagreement. From today's point of view, knowing that one has the alternative of reaching agreement t periods later is as if the new disagreement point was f (S, d) paid t periods later. Disagreement point convexity requires that the solution be insensitive to this kind of manipulation.
Our result, though not its proof, is closely related to Peters and van Damme (1991) . The main difference is that we replace their disagreement point continuity axiom by the twisting axiom. In this way, we get rid of a mainly technical axiom and replace it by a more intuitive and reasonable one. Needless to say, disagreement point continuity and twisting, are not equivalent. Further, neither of them implies the other.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the preliminary definitions and the axioms used in the characterization. Section 3 gives the main result. Section 4 shows that the axioms are independent. Finally, Section 5 discusses the related literature.
In this section, we present some basic definitions. \∅ that for each bargaining problem
). We now turn to properties of bargaining solutions.
We say that (S , d ) is obtained from the bargaining problem (S, d) by the transformations
The following properties are standard:
Symmetry: A bargaining solution f satisfies symmetry if for all symmetric bargaining problems where α i > 0 and β i ∈ IR, we have that
Since we do not require solutions to be single-valued, the above properties are not enough to characterize the Nash bargaining solution. In order to establish what is essentially Nash's characterization we need the following property.
Single-valuedness in symmetric problems: A bargaining solution f satisfies single-valuedness in symmetric problems if for every symmetric problem B ∈ B, f (B) is a singleton.
As stated in the introduction, we shall replace the axiom of IIA by the following three independent properties:
Independence of non-individually rational alternatives: A bargaining solution satisfies
independence with respect to non-individually rational alternatives if for every two prob-
Independence of non-individually rational alternatives requires that the solution be insensitive to changes in the feasible set that do not involve individually rational outcomes. It clearly implies that the solution always chooses a subset of the individually rational agreements. It can be checked that if a solution always chooses a subset of the individually rational agreements and also satisfies IIA then the solution satisfies independence of non-individually rational alternatives.
This axiom was first discussed in Peters (1986a) .
The following axiom says the following. Assume that the pointŝ = (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ) is chosen by the solution when the problem is (S, d). Assume further that the feasible set is modified so that all the subtracted points are preferred by one player toŝ whileŝ is preferred by the same player to each of the added points. Then the axiom requires thatŝ be weakly preferred by that same player to at least one point selected by the solution in the new problem (S , d).
Twisting: A bargaining solution f satisfies twisting if the following holds: Let (S, d) be a bargaining problem and let (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ) ∈ f (S, d). Let (S , d) be another bargaining problem such that for some agent i = 1, 2
Twisting is a mild monotonicity condition, which was introduced (in its single-valued version) by Thomson and Myerson (1980) who also showed that it is implied by IIA. Twisting is satisfied by most solutions discussed in the literature.
The next axiom was used in Peters and van Damme (1991) . Thomson (1994) , who calls it starshaped inverse succinctly summarizes this axiom as saying "that the move of the disagreement point in the direction of the desired compromise does not call for a revision of this compromise".
Disagreement point convexity:
A bargaining solution f satisfies disagreement point convexity
) and for every λ ∈ (0, 1) we
This axiom has a non-cooperative flavor and it is related to one of the properties of the Nash equilibrium concept for extensive form games, namely the property that one can "fold back the tree". Consider an extensive form game and fix a Nash equilibrium σ in it. For every node n in the tree, σ determines an outcome, z(n, σ), which is the outcome that would result if σ was played in the subgame that starts at node n. In particular, σ determines a Nash equilibrium outcome z(n 0 , σ), where n 0 denotes the root of the tree. Now, z(n 0 , σ) remains a Nash equilibrium outcome if we replace any given node n by the outcome z(n, σ). This "tree folding property"
is also satisfied by the Subgame Perfect equilibrium concept. However, we want to stress that this property is so basic that it is even satisfied by the Nash equilibrium concept. The axiom of disagreement point convexity tries to capture the tree folding property when applied to the subgame perfect equilibrium of a specific class of bargaining games, which we turn to describe.
Many non-cooperative models of bargaining are represented by an infinite-horizon stationary extensive form game with common discount factor δ, Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offers model being the most prominent example. Further, the solution concept used is subgame perfect equilibrium. All these games have the following properties:
1. The disagreement outcome corresponds to the infinite history in which the current proposal is rejected at every period.
2. There is an agreement a * such that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game dictates that a * is immediately agreed upon. Further, a * is immediately agreed upon at every subgame that is equivalent to the original game.
To see an application of the tree folding property to one such game, consider a stationary extensive form bargaining game Γ with the properties 1 and 2 above 3 and fix a period t. Assume that at 3 The reader may find it convenient to consider Rubinstein's (1982) game.
period t the proposer is the same one as in the first period so that all subgames that start at the beginning of period t are identical to Γ. Build a new game by replacing each subgame of Γ that starts at the beginning of period t by the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of that subgame. (Note that an outcome will typically have the format of "disagreement until period t and agreement a at t ". 4 ). By property 2 above, this outcome is "disagreement until period t, and agreement a * at t". The resulting game, Γ(t), is a finite horizon extensive form game in which a history of constant rejections leads to a * at period t. That is, in this new game disagreement leads to the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome a * , but delayed by t periods during which there is disagreement. Still, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this modified game Γ(t) is an immediate agreement on a * , which is what the tree folding property says.
Going back to the cooperative bargaining problem, let d be the present value of the utility stream of disagreement forever, and let s be the vector of utilities that correspond to the equilibrium outcome a * . Then, the shifted disagreement point (1 − λ)d + λs in the disagreement point convexity axiom corresponds precisely to the disagreement outcome of the amended game Γ(t), λ being δ t . To see this, note that the present value of a stream of t periods of disagreement and then agreement on a * at t is (1 − δ t )d i + δ t s i for player i, for i = 1, 2. 5 Using this interpretation, disagreement point convexity simply says that if we amend the bargaining problem so that the consequence of no agreement is that players disagree for t periods, and receive f (S, d) afterwards (yielding a payoff of (1 − δ t )d + δ t f (S, d)), then they should agree on f (S, d) to be paid from the outset. Note that for the disagreement point to move along the segment that connects d and s when we replace the subgame with its equilibrium outcome, it is essential to assume a common discount factor.
Disagreement point convexity seems to be an appropriate requirement, especially if one has in mind a stationary bargaining game. Dagan, Volij, and Winter (1999) exploit this axiom to give a characterization of the time-preference Nash solution in a setting with physical outcomes. 6
The Main Result
We can now present the main result.
Theorem 1 A bargaining solution satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, invariance, singlevaluedness in symmetric problems, independence with respect to non-individually rational allocations, twisting, and disagreement point convexity if and only if it is the Nash bargaining solution.
Proof : It is known that the Nash solution satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, invariance and single-valuedness in symmetric problems (see Nash (1950) ). By its definition, the Nash solution also satisfies independence of non-individually rational alternatives. Also, the Nash solution satisfies twisting, since twisting is weaker than IIA (see Thomson and Myerson (1980) or the appendix for the set valued version used here), which is in turn satisfied by the Nash solution.
Finally, Peters and van Damme (1991) showed that it also satisfies disagreement point convexity.
This shows that the Nash solution satisfies all the axioms in the theorem. We now show that no other solution satisfies all of them together. Suppose that a solution f satisfies all the axioms. ). The second problem is the individually rational region of the triangle whose hypothenuse is the line connecting s * andŝ (see Figure 1) .
First step. Consider first a triangular problem (S, d) where
S = co{(d 1 , d 2 ), (b 1 , d 2 ), (d 1 , b 2 )} with b i > d i for i = 1
Formally, the problem is (∆, (s
The two auxiliary problems.
By disagreement point convexity and independence of non-individually rational alternatives of f , we haveŝ
Further, we claim that
Indeed, if there was a point (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S \ ∆ with s 1 ≤ŝ 1 = 1/2, then we would have that (s 1 , s 2 ) is above the straight line that connectsŝ and s * . Therefore, the line segment that connects (s 1 , s 2 ) with s * is also above this line. But then, there would be a point in this segment which belongs to S and which dominatesŝ, which is impossible given thatŝ is a weakly efficient point of S. Similarly, if there was a point (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ ∆ \ S with s 1 ≥ŝ 1 , then (s 1 , s 2 ) would be on or below the straight line that connectsŝ and s * . Therefore, it would be a convex combination ofŝ, s * and (s * 2 , s * 2 ). Since the three points are in S , so would (s 1 , s 2 ), which contradicts the fact that (s 1 , s 2 ) / ∈ S .
Therefore, by twisting of f we have
such that
On the other hand, since (∆, (s * 2 , s * 2 )) is a triangular problem, by the first step in the proof
By construction of ∆, the Nash solution awards player 1 in (∆, (s * 2 , s * 2 )) more than 1/2, that is
which contradicts (2). By disagreement point convexity and independence of non-individually rational alternatives f (S(λ), λŝ) =ŝ = (0, b 2 ). Since (∆, λŝ) is a triangular problem, by the first step in the proof we have
By construction, we have
Therefore, by twisting we must have s 1 ≤ŝ 1 = 0 which contradicts equation 3. 
Independence of the axioms
The following examples show that the seven axioms used in the characterization are independent.
Beside each axiom there is a solution that fails to satisfy that axiom but which satisfies the other six.
Weak Pareto optimality:
The disagreement point solution: f : (S, d) → {d}.
Symmetry: Any asymmetric Nash solution.
Invariance: The Lexicographic Egalitarian solution (see, Chun and Peters (1988) ).
Single-valuedness in symmetric problems:
The set of weakly efficient and individually rational points.
Independence of non-individually rational alternatives:
The Kalai-Rosenthal solution:
it selects the maximal point of S in the segment connecting d and b (S, d) , Kalai and Rosenthal (1978) ). We also should note that the axioms of independence of non-individually rational alternatives, twisting and disagreement point convexity that we use to replace IIA, do not imply the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom: the solution that selects the disagreement point if the feasible set is a line segment and the Nash outcome otherwise, satisfies all the three axioms (in fact, satisfies all the axioms except for weak Pareto optimality) but does not satisfy IIA.
Related Literature
This paper provides a characterization of the Nash bargaining solution on Nash's original domain of bargaining problems, and in which the independence axiom is replaced by three other axioms.
Our result is closely related to Peters and van Damme (1991) and our contribution can be seen as eliminating of continuity axioms from the characterization. Continuity has been replaced by twisting, a mild axiom that, to our knowledge, is satisfied by most solution concepts discussed in the literature (the Perles-Maschler solution is one exception). Other characterizations of the Nash solution that use similar axioms, but still need continuity, are Peters (1986b) and Chun and Thomson (1990) . Mariotti (1999) also provides a characterization of the Nash solution without appealing to IIA, but, as opposed to the other mentioned papers, he reduces the number of axioms. In fact, there are only two characterizing axioms: invariance and Suppes-Sen proofness.
The same can be said about Mariotti (2000) who replaces IIA and symmetry by strong individual rationality and the axiom of Maximal Symmetry.
Chun and Thomson (1990) 
is efficient and S is smooth both at f (S, d) and 
We now investigate the relation between these two axioms and disagreement point convexity.
Claim 1 If a single-valued bargaining solution, f , satisfies Pareto optimality, independence of non-individually rational alternatives and D.Q-CAV., then it also satisfies disagreement point convexity.
Proof : Let (S, d) be a bargaining problem and let s = f (S, d). Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and assume that
, which, without loss of generality, can be taken to be agent 1. Therefore, we can find an α ∈ (0, 1) close enough to 1 such that the point d = (1−α)d+αs satisfies d 1 > f 1 (S, (1−λ)d+λs).
Since f satisfies individual rationality, The Nash solution is not defined for the above domain. However, one can extend it, as Peters and van Damme (1991) do, so as to select the only efficient and individually rational point when the disagreement point is weakly efficient. In this case, our characterization goes through and the axioms of weak Pareto optimality and disagreement point convexity can, as a corollary of the observation of the previous paragraph, be replaced by Pareto optimality and R.D.LIN.
Our characterization is on Nash's original domain. In particular, we restrict attention to twoperson bargaining problems. It is not clear whether the same axioms are sufficient to fully characterize the Nash bargaining solution for general n-person bargaining problems. The Nash bargaining solution does satisfy all the axioms. However, our proof makes use of the 2-dimensionality of the problem. In particular, when there are more than 3 players, it is not clear how to build the auxiliary set ∆ with the critical properties used in step 2 of our proof.
